250 DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY Part II
breaches of treaty obligations—the enrolment of auxiliary police as
an infringement of an agreement, laying down the size and character
of the German police force, which had been reached between the
Allied Powers at the Boulogne Conference in June 1920 and accepted
by Germany at the Spa Conference in the following month,1 and the
incident at Kehl as an infringement of Article 43 of the Peace Treaty
(which prohibited Hhe maintenance and the assembly of armed
forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manoeuvres
of any kind,' in the demilitarized zone).2 The uneasiness of Germany's
eastern neighbours was illustrated at the same time by the action of
the Polish Government in notifying the League's High Commissioner
at Danzig on the 6th March that they had decided to reinforce the
Polish guard stationed at the munitions depot on the Westerplatte,3
in view of the danger of an attack on the depot.
This increase in the tension in Europe was reflected in the atmo-
sphere at Geneva when Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon arrived
there on the llth March. Two days earlier the General Commission,
having completed its discussion of effectives,4 had begun to examine
the question of land material, and the debate had at once brought
the German and the French delegates into direct opposition. Herr
Nadolny expressed the opinion that the problem of qualitative dis-
armament was ripe for decision, and must no longer be postponed
pending the attainment of a greater degree of security. The time had
come when the heavily armed states must reduce their armaments.5
Monsieur Massigli was equally uncompromising. He declared that
France could not agree to any reduction of her armaments unless the
1 See the Survey for 1920-3, pp. 108-9.
2 The Nazis were withdrawn from Kehl within thirty-six hours, and in reply
to representations from the French Ambassador on the 14th March Freiherr
von Neurath explained that the Government did not consider either the Kehl
incident or the enrolment of auxiliary police as a breach of treaty obligations
because neither the S.A. nor the police could be regarded as an armedf orce. The
French Ambassador had already, some three weeks earlier, drawn the attention
of the German Government to the bad effect on French opinion of Nazi
demonstrations on the bridges at Kehl and Hiiningen.
3 For the question of the Westerplatte munitions depot, see the Survey for
1925, vol. ii, pp. 242-3, and the Survey for 1932, pp. 375 and 377, See also the
present volume, p. 187 above. 4 See pp. 238-41 above.
5 This thesis was elaborated in greater detail by Herr Nadolny in an article
which was published on the llth March in Volkerbund, the organ of the German
League of Nations Society. A week earlier the same journal had contained
an article by Freiherr von Neurath which also laid stress on the fact that
Germany's patience was exhausted. The German Foreign Minister complained
that the General Commission had devoted too much time to discussing the
French plan—which was a plan for security rather than disarmament—and
declared that it was the security of Germany, not that of France, which was
threatened by the existing situation.